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Security Council Resolution 2310 (2016) [on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Disarmament]

S/RES/2310 (2016)No PDF available

Who created this mandate?

A Resolution of the Security Council, under agenda item 23Maintenance of international peace and security, published in 2016.

What other versions does this mandate have?

2 versions · 2009–2016
  • 2016S/RES/2310 (2016)Security Council resolution 2310 (2016) [on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament]LatestCompare with previous version
  • 2009S/RES/1887(2009)Security Council resolution 1887 (2009) [on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament]

iVersions are identified automatically by matching titles within the same organ (~97% accuracy on a manual audit).

What subjects does this mandate have?

5 topics
Disarmament AgreementsNuclear DisarmamentNuclear Non-ProliferationNuclear Weapon TestsVerification

What does this mandate say?

9 operative paragraphs
1
Urges all States that have either not signed or not ratified the Treaty, particularly the eight remaining Annex 2 States, to do so without further delay;
2
Encourages all State Signatories, including Annex 2 States, to promote the universality and early entry into force of the Treaty;
3
Recalls the statements by each of the five nuclear-weapon States, noted by resolution 984 (1995), in which they give security assurances against the use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon State Parties to the NPT, and affirms that such security assurances strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime;
4
Calls upon all States to refrain from conducting any nuclear-weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion and to maintain their moratoria in this regard, commends those States’ national moratoria, some of which are established by national legislation pending entry into force of the Treaty, emphasizes that such moratoria are an example of responsible international behaviour that contributes to international peace and stability and should continue, while stressing that such moratoria do not have the same permanent and legally binding effect as entry into force of the Treaty, and notes the Joint Statement on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty by China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America of September 15, 2016, in which those States noted that, inter alia, “a nuclear-weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion would defeat the object and purpose of the CTBT”;
5
Underlines the need to maintain momentum towards completion of all elements of the Treaty verification regime, and in this regard, calls upon all States to provide the support required to enable the PrepCom to complete all its tasks in the most efficient and cost effective way, and encourages all States hosting International Monitoring System facilities to transmit data to the IDC on a testing and provisional basis, pending entry into force of the Treaty;
6
Welcomes the voluntary information in the national statements in the PrepCom by States listed in Annex 1 to the Protocol to the Treaty as responsible for one or more facilities of the IMS on the status of completing the construction of those facilities as well as regarding the status of transmission of data from their facilities to the IDC, encourages States hosting IMS facilities to complete construction of the IMS facilities in a timely manner as provided for by the Treaty and text on the establishment of the PrepCom, and invites the Provisional Technical Secretariat to provide a report to all State Signatories within 180 days of the adoption of this resolution on the status of States Signatories assessed contributions to the PrepCom and any additional support provided by State Signatories for the completion of the Treaty’s verification regime and for the maintenance and operational needs for the IDC and IMS;
7
Recognizes that even absent entry into force of the Treaty the monitoring and analytical elements of the verification regime, operating on a testing and provisional basis, are at the disposal of the international community in conformity with the Treaty and under the guidance of the Preparatory Commission, and that such elements contribute to regional stability as a significant confidence-building measure, and strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime;
8
Affirms that entry into force of the Treaty will contribute to the enhancement of international peace and security through its effective prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects and through its contribution to nuclear disarmament and recognizes that the Provisional Technical Secretariat has demonstrated its utility in bringing tangible scientific and civil benefits to States, for example through early tsunami warnings and seismological monitoring, and in this regard encourages the PrepCom to consider ways to ensure that these benefits can be broadly shared by the international community in conformity with the Treaty, through capacity building and the sharing of relevant expertise on the verification regime;
9
Decides to remain seized of the matter.

iParagraph content is machine-extracted from UN documents. For authoritative content, please refer to the official UN document.

Table of contents

No headings found in this document.