Steps to Building a Common Roadmap Towards a World without Nuclear Weapons

A/RES/80/48No PDF available

Who created this mandate?

A Resolution of the General Assembly, under agenda item 99bbSteps to building a common roadmap towards a world without nuclear weapons, published in 2025.

What other versions does this mandate have?

4 versions · 2022–2025

2025A/RES/80/48Steps to building a common roadmap towards a world without nuclear weaponsLatestCompare with previous version
2024A/RES/79/41Steps to building a common roadmap towards a world without nuclear weaponsCompare with previous version
2023A/RES/78/40Steps to building a common roadmap towards a world without nuclear weaponsCompare with previous version
2022A/RES/77/76Steps to building a common roadmap towards a world without nuclear weapons

Versions are identified automatically by matching titles within the same organ (~97% accuracy on a manual audit).

What subjects does this mandate have?

8 topics

Democratic People's Republic of Korea Disarmament Education Disarmament Negotiations Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Nuclear Disarmament Nuclear Non-Proliferation Nuclear Safeguards Nuclear Weapon States

What does this mandate say?

13 operative paragraphs

Urges all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to make every effort to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used again, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and to refrain from any inflammatory rhetoric concerning the use of nuclear weapons, based on the recognition that all States have a shared interest in averting a nuclear war;

Calls upon the nuclear-weapon States, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, to honour and respect all existing negative security assurances undertaken by them, including in connection with the treaties and relevant protocols of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non‑nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons consistent with their respective obligations and commitments;

Calls upon all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to apply the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the implementation of their obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; to immediately pursue enhanced transparency measures by providing information in line with Action 21 of the 2010 Action Plan, related to concrete data on their nuclear arsenals and capabilities, without prejudice to their national security, as well as national measures related to nuclear disarmament including their nuclear policies, doctrines and nuclear risk reduction measures, including status of production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and to provide frequent and detailed reporting on the implementation of the Treaty and opportunities for discussion of all nuclear-weapon States’ reports, taking into account Actions 20 and 21 of the 2010 Action Plan and paragraph 187 (35) of NPT/CONF.2020/WP.77 as a useful reference, recognizing the efforts made by some nuclear-weapon States in this regard; and calls upon nuclear-weapon States, especially those that have yet to do so, to engage with non‑nuclear-weapon States in a meaningful dialogue on transparency regarding their nuclear arsenals and avoiding an arms race, including through a regular process for an open explanation of national reports coupled with an interactive discussion with non‑nuclear-weapon States and civil society participants at future meetings in the review process for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, stressing the importance for all nuclear-weapon States to continuously engage in such practices;

Emphasizes that avoiding a new nuclear arms race, the risk of which is increasing, accompanied by the rapid and non‑transparent quantitative expansion and opaque qualitative improvement of nuclear forces by some nuclear-weapon States, is vital in getting closer to a world free of nuclear weapons, and urges all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non‑deployed, regardless of their location, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures;

Calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to immediately commence and bring to an early conclusion, negotiations on a non‑discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein, and upon Conference members to engage in relevant activities of the Conference towards that goal, further calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to declare or maintain voluntary moratoriums on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, as well as encourages all States that have not yet done so to initiate a process towards the dismantling or conversion for peaceful uses of facilities for the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in line with Action 18 of the 2010 Action Plan, and, consistent with Action 16 of the 2010 Action Plan, encourages nuclear-weapon States to commit to declaring, as appropriate, to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) all fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes and to place such material as soon as practicable under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes;

Emphasizes that the transparency of the management of civil plutonium must be maintained and any attempt to produce or support the production of plutonium for military programmes under the guise of civilian programmes undermines the objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, underscores the importance of the implementation of the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (INFCIRC 549), and, in this regard, calls upon all States that committed to reporting annually their holdings of all plutonium in peaceful nuclear activities to IAEA to fulfil those commitments;

Urges all States that have yet to sign and/or ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to do so in all expediency, particularly the now nine States listed in its Annex 2, whose ratification is required for the Treaty to enter into force, and, pending the entry into force of the Treaty, to refrain from conducting nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, and any other action that would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty, and to declare or maintain existing moratoriums on nuclear weapon test explosions, as well as to assist the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in its work in preparing for the entry into force of the Treaty;

Calls upon all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to commit to further identifying, exploring and implementing effective risk reduction measures necessary to mitigate risks relating to nuclear weapons use that arise from miscalculation, misperception, miscommunication or accident, inter alia, to intensify dialogue among and between the nuclear-weapon States and with the non‑nuclear-weapon States, to develop and make every effort to implement effective crisis prevention and management arrangements, mechanisms and tools, to maintain the practice of not targeting each other or any other State with nuclear weapons and keep them at the lowest possible alert levels, while noting that risk reduction is neither a substitute nor a prerequisite for nuclear disarmament;

Also calls upon all States to continue their strong support for initiatives to develop multilateral disarmament verification and capacity-building in support of nuclear disarmament and as an effective step towards achieving the objectives of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and to further conceptual and practical work on nuclear disarmament verification, taking into account the importance of partnerships between nuclear-weapon States and non‑nuclear-weapon States on this matter and encouraging broad participation by all States in such initiatives, and welcomes that the Group of Governmental Experts to further consider nuclear disarmament verification issues adopted its final report by consensus in May 2023;

Underscores the importance of complying with the obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and addressing all non‑compliance matters in order to uphold the integrity of the Treaty and the authority of the safeguards system;

Reaffirms the commitment to achieving the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes, as well as all other existing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes, of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions, and the obligation of all Member States to fully implement all relevant Security Council resolutions, notes with serious concern the announcement by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of 9 September 2022 of an updated law on nuclear policy lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons, and supplementation in September 2023 of nuclear force-building policy in its Constitution as well as the revelation of images of nuclear-related facilities including uranium enrichment facilities in September 2024 and January 2025, urges the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to return at an early date to, and fully comply with, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and IAEA safeguards, and confirms that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea cannot and will never be recognized as a nuclear-weapon State, as stated in Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006) of 14 October 2006 and 1874 (2009) of 12 June 2009, and in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

Calls upon all States to facilitate efforts on nuclear disarmament and non‑proliferation education, which is a useful and effective means to advance the goals of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in support of achieving a world without nuclear weapons, inter alia, efforts in which the young generation can actively engage, including through dialogue platforms, mentoring, internships, fellowships, scholarships, model events and youth group activities, as well as to raise awareness of the realities of the use of nuclear weapons, including through, among others, visits by leaders, youth and others to and interactions with communities and people, including the hibakusha, those who have suffered the use of nuclear weapons irrespective of their nationalities and origins, and who pass on their experiences to the future generations through long-standing grass-roots efforts around the world, including those of Nihon Hidankyo, recognized with the Nobel Peace Prize 2024, and welcomes concrete measures in this regard, inter alia, the Young Professionals Network of P5 academics, the Youth4Disarmament Initiative, “Disarmament education: resources for learning” and the “Youth Leader Fund for a world without nuclear weapons”;

Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its eighty-first session, under the item entitled “General and complete disarmament”, the sub-item entitled “Steps to building a common roadmap towards a world without nuclear weapons”.

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